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Objectives  
          This study is conducted to investigate the significance of the two ownership 
structures, namely direct state-ownership and indirect state-ownership, in the context 
of airline companies. The research also extends to examine the underlying reason for 
the implied distinctions. Agency cost is the main measure used to compare the 
efficiency between the two ownership structures. This paper also seeks to test out the 
relative importance of each characteristic in relation to agency cost. 
 
Summary 
          The findings supported two hypotheses: (H2) indirect state-owned enterprise 
has lower agency cost due to greater use of debt and (H4) indirect state-owned 
enterprise has lower agency cost due to the international diversification. The findings, 
however, rejected the two remaining hypotheses: (H1) indirect state-owned enterprise 
has lower agency cost due to greater transparency pressures and (H3) indirect state-






          In the comparison between indirect and direct state-owned airline companies, it 
is evident that indirect state-owned airlines performed more efficiently than direct state-
owned airlines.  
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The emergence of privatization in late 1970s has spurred many controversies around 
privatization and state-ownership. Most of the arguments for and against state-ownership 
slowly surfaced around agency cost. Agency cost is the cost induced when managers do 
not maximise the interest of their shareholders; but maximising their personal interest, at 
the expense of the shareholders instead. The supporters of privatization were positive 
about the benefits induced by strict separation of business and politics. The clear 
distinction of business and politics means greater transparency, more objective decision 
making and fewer opportunities for expropriation of private benefits. The critics, on the 
other hand however, were sceptical of the effectiveness of privatization due to various 
social concerns such as market failure and the neglect of lower social classes. Gradually, 
the number of debates gave rise to the development of ownership branches, amongst 
which is ISOE (indirect state-owned enterprise, also known as sovereign wealth fund-
owned-enterprises) and DSOE (direct state-owned enterprises) used in this thesis.  
 
Before zooming into the different types of state-ownership structures, an understanding 
of the scope and definitive characteristics of state-owned enterprise is essential. A state-
owned enterprise (SOE) is defined by the OECD using different attributes. Generally, 
SOE is “any corporate entity recognized by law as an enterprise, and in which the state 
exercises ownership, should be considered as an SOE” (OECD, 2015). Ownership and 
control of SOE is subjected “under the control of the state, either by the state being the 
ultimate beneficiary owner of the majority of voting shares or otherwise exercising an 
equivalent degree of control, which has the state of a country possessing more than 50% 
of the shares” (ibid). Another key term of this research is ownership entity, defined as 
“part of the state responsible for the ownership function, or the exercise of ownership 
rights in SOEs with either a single state ownership agency, a coordinating agency or a 
government ministry responsible for exercising state ownership” (ibid). This term is 





Direct state-owned enterprise (DSOE) is when the ownership entity of the SOE is the 
governmental ministry of the country. Some examples in the airline industry are Finnair, 
having 55.8% of shares owned by the Finnish Ministry of Finance (Finnair Oyj, 2016) and 
Garuda Indonesia, having 60.51% of shares owned by Ministry of State-owned enterprise 
Indonesia (PT Garuda Indonesia (Persero) Tbk, 2016).  
 
Indirect state-owned enterprise (ISOE) is when the ownership entity of the SOE is under 
the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) of the country. SWFs are pools of assets owned and 
managed directly or indirectly by governments to achieve national objectives (Blundell-
Wignall, Hu & Yermo, 2008). Some examples in the airline industry are Singapore Airline, 
having 55.63% of shares owned by Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd. (Singapore Airline, 2017) 
and Emirates Airline, having 100% of shares owned by Investment Corporation of Dubai 
(Investment Corporation of Dubai, 2016).  
 
The industrial setting for this thesis is the airline industry due to the diversified use of 
ownership structures to tackle the issue of agency cost.  
 
This research is a novel case because it has a different target group (direct and indirect 
state-owned structure) that does not have a large pool of prior research. Most recent 
research on the ownership of an airline merely revolves around the impact of profitability 
(Chen, Chen & Wei, 2017). My research, however, seeks to expand the domains of 
ownership into the research of agency cost, which allows for greater understanding of the 
choice of state ownership than the existing descriptive studies of ownership structure and 
profitability (Backx, Carney, and Gedajlovic, 2002; Fernandes & Pires Capobianco, 2001; 
2004).   
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1.2 Research problem 
Agency cost remained as an important theory for most fields, penetrating concepts from 
accounting (Ronen & Balachandran, 1995; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983), finance (Fama, 
1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1986), organisational behaviour ((Kosnik & 
Bittenhausen, 1992) and economics (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973; Spence & 
Zeckhauser, 1971). For many years, famous researchers have been using various 
incentives policies and monitoring schemes to overcome the problem of agency cost 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Liu, 1982; Beatty & Zajac, 1994). Given the number of 
research on agency cost however, there are still few studies that evaluate the relative 
presence of agency cost within state-ownership itself. This is due to the relatively new 
concept of ISOE adopted by only a few countries (Lee, 2014). Despite that, there is a 
need to understand why certain countries prefer to adopt the new ownership structure. 
Also, due to the prevalence of change from DSOE to ISOE in airline industries (Backx, 
Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002), it is also crucial to examine if this research is only applicable 
to the airline industry.  
 
In addition to the broad level of ownership-profitability analysis, this thesis seeks to fill the 
apparent absence of the individual factor analysis within agency cost, specifically political 
objectivity and transparency. In summary, this thesis will concentrate on the relationship 
of the characteristics of direct versus indirect state ownership and the agency costs of the 
airline industry with the use of hypothesis testing. 
 
1.3 Research Question 
This research seeks to first compare the different state-ownership structures of airline 
companies with the characteristics of agency cost and then conclude on the impact of 
agency cost.   




• What are the general characteristics of direct state-owned or indirect state-owned 
companies?  
• To what extent is agency cost different in each structure? 
• What are the specific characteristics of these structures in the airline industry? 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
• To understand which structure has a lower agency cost. 
• To understand the relative importance of each characteristic in relation to agency 
cost. 
 
The next chapter will introduce the concept of agency cost in detail, specific to the airline 
industry and different ownership structures. The understanding of existing literatures will 
help us generate a better understanding of the different concepts and their potential 





2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Agency cost is the cost incurred when managers as agents of the company consciously 
choose to maximise their personal interest at the expense of shareholders’ interest; 
although ideally, agents are expected to prioritise the interest of their principals, which in 
this case is the shareholders. This is an important concept to explore in relation to the 
DSOE and ISOE structure because current focus on profitability as a performance 
measure is a myopic view that seldom considers the underlying factors of profitability, 
amongst which is agency cost (Boardman, Shapiro, & Vining, 1997). Also, the literature 
review aims to contextualise the theory within the airline industry due to the diversity in 
ownership structures, which suggests a need for understanding the ownership changes, 
as well as the existing agency problems that are as yet uncovered. 
 
The literature review will first define the scope of agency cost and the origins of DSOE 
and ISOE. Following this will be a breakdown of traditional agency cost factors and the 
introduction of new sub-components, which will help reason the comparative advantage 
of ISOE against DSOE. Finally, a conceptual framework will attempt to justify the research 
question.  
 
The main basis of literature analysis for comparison of DSOE and ISOE will be the agency 
cost theory. The theory will be explored in broad terms, as a factor of separation of cash 
flow and voting rights and information asymmetry. With the expansion of each factors into 
political objectives and transparency, this paper can better distinguish the differences of 
DSOE and ISOE. Ultimately, the application of hypothesis towards the airline industry can 
also test the relevance of research in airline industry. 
 
2.1 Origins of DSOE and ISOE 
In early studies, Jensen & Meckling (1976) laid the foundations of agency being 
contingent upon monitoring activities and the separation of ownership and control. This 
overarching concept of agency cost can be traced to the origins of DSOE, ISOE and SOE 
in general. In the past, the establishment of SOE centred around public policy goals, such 
as necessary provision of public good, addressing market failures, curbing oligopolistic 
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behaviour and promoting social objectives like employment generation, regional 
development, poverty and minority group protection (World Bank, 2014a).  
 
As agency cost increases, specifically the divergence of interest between principals 
(dominant government shareholder) and agents (manager), the objectives of SOE 
gradually veer towards political agendas and expropriation of private benefits (Tirole, 
1994). Shleifer & Vishny (1994) further delved into the mechanisms of agency problems, 
which is the use of government subsidies and bribes in facilitating a two-way political 
agenda-expropriation relationship. Both these authors clearly established the extent of 
agency problem in SOE structure despite the benevolent initial objective of solving market 
failures. Subsequently, the adoption of ISOE became the source of solution towards this 
conflicting problem. Indeed, there exist presumed similarities between DSOE and ISOE 
due to their origin’s development. However, the following evaluation of literatures will be 
key towards discovering the dichotomous characteristics of DSOE and ISOE.  
 
The motives for SWF were never a definite answer. Singapore’s SWF - Temasek 
Holdings was founded on the hopes for better long term international diversification of 
assets; China’s SWF – China Investment Corporation was created to sustain its exchange 
rate strategy; Norway’s Government Pension Fund served the purpose of non-renewable 
energy fund and national pension fund (Das, Mazarei & Hoorn, 2010; Chen, 2016). As 
seen, there is no unifying factor that clearly explains the reasons for SWF. All but one 
author, Truman (2007) mentioned the possibility of mitigation of agency cost with 
transparency as the underlying reason for SWF. This hence provides us an opportunity 
and direction to analysing the role of agency cost in SWF. 
 
2.2 Characteristics of Agency Cost 
Agency cost was first introduced as a research of risk-sharing behaviour among 
individuals and groups (Arrow, 1971; Wilson, 1968). Due to the results of different risk-
averse behaviours among different stakeholders, Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Ross 
(1973) then became the forefathers of agency theory when they identified the primary 
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factor being the principal-agent relationship. This relationship bound by a contractual 
relationship for agents to perform task delegated by the principals does not guarantee the 
actions from the agents (ibid). This stems from the principal-agent interest divide and the 
difficulty in monitoring the behaviours of agents (ibid). Subsequently, many policies such 
as board structures (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Kosnik, 1987), salary incentives (Eisenhardt, 
1989), acquisition and diversification strategies (Amihud & Lev, 1981), ownership and 
financing structures (Argawal & Mandelker, 1987; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and vertical 
integration (Anderson, 1985; Eccles, 1985) became the focus to align the interest of 
agents (managers) with the principals (shareholders), both focusing on maximising 
company’s wealth rather than managers’ private wealth.  
 
Although there has been a wide research scope on agency cost across different sectors 
and perspectives, we will only concentrate on the 2 major factors of agency cost, namely, 
the separation of cash flow and voting rights (Berle & Means, 1932) and information 
asymmetry (Hayek, 1945). 
 
2.2.1 The separation of cash flow and voting rights 
The separation of cash flow and voting rights is when the managers of the company are 
not the owners of the companies and hence are unlikely to prioritise company’s benefits, 
in accordance with shareholder’s interests (Berle & Means, 1932). In light of this issue, 
board of directors is established to align both interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Employee as shareholder schemes also strive to incentivise managers (ibid). Regardless 
of efforts to reconcile interest, the differing levels of risk perception for managers and 
shareholders is another challenge that can be difficult to eliminate (Mawanza, 2014). Also, 
in our case, the large bloc-shareholding of SOE further amplifies the immunity of 
managers as this means that managers will remain as minority shareholders regardless 
of their efforts (Wang, 2010). As seen, agency cost persists and evolves in different ways, 
regardless of ways to curb. To further investigate the root causes of agency cost in SOE, 




2.2.2 Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is another source of agency problem. Hayek (1945) was the first 
to theorise the benefits of knowledge to the economy as a whole. However, only when 
strengthened by Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) theory on the imbalance distribution of 
knowledge, was the relationship between information asymmetry and agency cost is 
established. Referring to the same reasoning of principal-agent interest divergence, 
information is not available to both parties often due to conflicting interest, causing agency 
cost. Taking the role of both shareholder and government, there exist certain political 
information that remains sensitive for disclosure to managers of the firms (March, 1962). 
Vice-versa, managers might feel the urge to restrict information flow to shareholders for 
their private benefits (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). This will cause detriments to the company 
and hence transparency is a new variable in this thesis.  
 
2.3 Airline industry and Agency Cost 
A broad overview of the airline industry governance will lead to a result of various 
ownership structures. Backx, Carney and Gedajlovic (2002) presented the most 
comprehensive macro structures of airline ownership – private, mixed and public. Later 
in 2002, Carney and Dostaler also explored the other variations of airline ownership – 
managerial, entrepreneurial, and stakeholder governance. Recently, the birth of ISOE 
with regards to the airline industry was implied by Sturesson, McIntyre, and Jones (2015) 
and Abramov, Radygin, Entov and Chernova (2017). The evolutions of ownership across 
the years had yield many different opinions on their performances, however the real 
question lies with the underlying reasons for the changes in these airlines. 
 
The SOE structure is retained by most airlines because it is believed that these airlines 
are able to stimulate economic progress, employment, trade and tourism, and capital 
retention (Chang, Williams & Hsu, 2004). Warden (2003) further adds that these airlines 
are essential to maintain national security. Examples of these airlines are Finnair, 
Singapore Airlines, Garuda Indonesia and Emirates Airlines. The performances of airlines 
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however became debateable when the research on the benefits of SOE vs privatisation 
rarely yield a consistent result. Research by Boardman and Vining (1989) was refuted by 
Backx, Carney, and Gedajlovic (2002) who supported better performance of private 
airlines. It must be noted however, that the research by both authors were conducted 
within a specific outdated period, therefore does not account for the recent changes in 
ownership structure. Also, since they only accounted for the profitability measures of 
airlines, this research differentiates itself by analyzing the internal problems that causes 
such disparity in results for profitability using agency cost. 
 
Next, we turn to another major ownership structure- private airlines. Privatisation is an 
important contrast to state-owned airlines due to their unique position of separation of 
political and management entities. As such, researcher such as De Alessi (1983) 
contended that private ownership is superior to state-owned. The benefits of privatisation 
in general is summarised by Shleifer (1998) being the greater possibility to innovate and 
lower cost as the involvement of governmental objectives are absent. Specific to the 
airline industry, Backx, Carney, and Gedajlovic (2002) also supported the private model 
of ownership for airline attributing to better utilization of airline assets and minimization of 
cost. Privatization does provide for a more efficient system, however, with the possibility 
of social detriments persisting, many have considered the compromising position of a 
mixed-ownership structure. This hinted at the adoption of ISOE, a subset of mixed 
enterprise in the airline industry.  
 
Many airlines such as Singapore airline, Emirates Airline and Turkish Airlines are under 
the governance of SWF, therefore labelled as ISOE in this research. As compared to 
ISOE, DSOE airlines such as Air India, South African Airways and Aeroflot are performing 
at sub-standard levels (Doganis, 2001). Inevitably, there are outliers such as Malaysian 
Airline, a ISOE that performs worse than its peers and conversely, Finnair, a DSOE that 
performs outstandingly compared to others. These are coherent with Boardman and 
Vining (1989) arguing that mixed-enterprise did not outperform SOE despite 
outperforming private corporations. This contradicts the supporting argument on private 
corporations’ performance exceeding SOE as mixed enterprise is expected to outperform 
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SOE as well. This inconsistency therefore indicates that there are substantial reasons to 
believe that the catalyst for ownership changes, more specifically the branching of SOE 
into DSOE and ISOE for the airline industry, lies beyond profitability measures but agency 
cost. There is a need to seek alternative analysis – agency cost of the ownership 
structures within the airline industry. 
 
Agency cost in airline industry arise in 2 forms- political involvement and transparency. 
According to Doganis (1991), political objectives are very interlinked with state-owned 
airlines, ultimately affecting the financial capabilities of these airlines. Carney and 
Dostaler (2006) then explicitly highlight the severity of agency problems by showing how 
the airline industries are constantly facing shareholder pressures via voting rights and 
external takeover. These are instances of political involvement influencing the decision 
making of agents in maximising the wealth of the company.  
 
In relative terms, ISOE are considered to have lower agency cost due to greater 
distancing of political-business relations (Das, Mazarei, and Hoorn, 2010) and greater 
pressure for transparency (Truman, 2007). While there are much benefits from DSOE 
airlines, Shleifer and Vishny (1994, 1998) and Bennedsen (2000) cautioned that it could 
be disguised as means to facilitate political or private benefits, thus highlighting the close 
relations with political objectives. For instance, by forcing excess employment and 
approving government projects that transfers wealth to political supporters. Also, 
compared against DSOE, ISOE has a greater pressure for accountability and 
transparency, assuming the adherence to Santiago Principles. Santiago Principles sets 
the standards for ISOE to provide openness of information, facilitating a more conducive 
environment for separation of political involvement, commitment towards better 
investment decisions and lower information asymmetry (Kern, 2008). Overall, it is 




2.4 Analysis of micro elements that lead to agency cost 
2.4.1 Political objectives 
Political objectives are key to understanding the degree of agency cost within the two 
structures. This is especially important because fundamentally SOEs are created to fulfil 
government and social objectives. This poses a contradictory point of view in business 
sense because profit maximization could perhaps be achieved at the expense of 
government and social objectives (Goodman & Loveman, 1991). In this manner, ISOE 
could be seen as having a smaller degree of agency cost compared to DSOE due to its 
relatively distant connection with the state.  
 
Referring back to the definition of Sovereign Wealth Fund by Das, Mazarei, and Hoorn 
(2010), the emphasis on separate entity, as opposed to internal government, in managing 
state fund is to “provide insulation against short term political pressure” This means that 
political involvement for ISOE is supposedly lower than that of DSOE. Despite the 
counter-arguments by Summers (2007) on the involvement of political powers in ISOE to 
gain unfair advantage for higher returns, it does not invalidate the distant relationship of 
ISOE that causes a division of principal and agent. Instead, it serves to reinforce the 
parallel nature of principal and agent interest, which is profit maximisation. 
 
2.4.1.1 Asset allocation and overseas political objectives 
The ability to diversify portfolio’s assets internationally creates a tendency for political 
objectivity to be present in ISOE. It is argued that ISOE is an instrument for international 
political interest whereas DSOE is used in domestic affairs. Referring to agency cost, in 
this case, the divergence of principal and agent’s interest is greater in ISOE than DSOE 
in the international arena. Batson (2008, 13 Sep) mentioned the case of China using 
reserves to influence Costa Rica’s perspective towards Taiwan. In 2005, China’s state-
owned oil enterprise CNOOC and United Arab Emirates’ DP World made efforts to 
acquire major U.S. ports and sparked great political reactions (Casselman, 2007).  
Similarly, the acquisition of Thai telecom firm Shin Corp owned by the family of previous 
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Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in January 2006 caused a political crisis in Thailand 
(Aizenman & Glick, 2007).  As seen, government could potentially influence the objectives 
of ISOE to favour certain political agenda. These series of events therefore also prompted 
the question of whether ISOE are more inefficient in terms of agency cost due to their 
lack of political objectives internationally. 
 
Although this is seen as logical, Helleiner (2009) disproves the assertion by proving 
government objectives for ISOE are more domestic-focused than internationally focused. 
Shih (2009) also added that the conditions under which ISOE is used for political 
objectives are dependent on the political regime of the country. A politically unified country 
such as Singapore will use Temasek Holding for long-term profits and strengthening of 
domestic economy; whereas a politically fragmented country like China has a higher 
tendency to use ISOE for domestic political and bureaucratic conflicts, prioritizing foreign 
policy objectives and sacrificing long-term profits (ibid). Given the conditional reasons of 
ISOE in the influence of political interest, ISOE now becomes a weaker political 
instrument for governments hence a smaller divide between principal and agent. 
 
 
2.4.1.2 The use of debt 
The use of debt creates commitment incentives to managers and hence reduces agency 
cost (Grossman & Hart, 1982; Williams, 1987). The presence of debt is key to highlight 
the underlying agency cost, as demonstrated by Nazir, Saita and Nawaz (2012). In their 
results, the positive correlation of total debt and short-term debt ratio with asset utilization 
ratio (AUR) indicates a reduction of agency cost. This is because the use of debt reduces 
the free cash flow available to managers (Jensen, 1986, Stulz, 1990), and thus lowers 
the probability of overinvestment (Harvey et al., 2004; D’Mello and Miranda, 2010). In 
addition, the use of debt introduces the bank as an external monitoring agent, aligning 
the interest of profitability between managers and shareholders (Ang. et al., 2000). This 
hence explains the relevance of capital structure within political objectives in the 




The 2 main factors explaining a greater use of debt by SOE are the inability to issue 
stocks and SOE’s ability to borrow at favourable rates due to implicit or explicit loan 
guarantees (Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001). Contrast to that, Bertoni & Lugo (2017) 
explicitly mentioned the 3 reasons for SWF to use debt – alternative financing source, 
influence on bond market and strategy specific reasons. Since there is an apparent lack 
of agency cost analysis, an opportunity to explore the relationship between debt financing 
and agency cost is present.  
 
Further research into the use of debt within the ownership structure reaps a result of ISOE 
taking a higher debt than DSOE (Wang, 2013). Many research concluded a lower debt 
ratio, hence implying a lower agency cost (Hardiyanto, Achsani, Sembel & Maulana, 2015; 
Wang, 2013; OECD, 2014).  
 
2.4.2 Accountability and Transparency  
As political involvement is inevitable in most SOE, the expectation for SOE to balance 
between market, social and political interest is high (Aharoni, 1981; 1986; Radon & Thaler, 
2005). The complexity and need to reconcile the interests of these parties is evident 
through the setting of standards of accountability and transparency by OECD (2010). It is 
therefore concluded by the majority of researchers that accountability and transparency 
remain an essential component of SOE. 
 
The bare minimum of general SOE transparency reporting standards were proposed by 
the Accountability and Transparency: A Guide for State Ownership report (OECD, 2010). 
Although the report outlined various ways of reporting and ensure transparency, the true 
implementation of transparency scheme only occur when coupled with strong legal 
regulations (OECD, 2016). For example, the Decree 1172 in Argentina requires for all the 
SOEs to disclose their financial information to the public; in Korea, the Official Information 
Disclosure Act 1998 even specify for the operations of SOE to be reported (World Bank, 
2014b). However, within clauses of regulations, there exist exceptions whereby in 
practice, only a small handful of SOE truly adhere to the guidelines (OECD, 2016). This 
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system of transparency therefore depicts the inherent difficulty of ensuring transparency 
and accountability in SOE.  
 
The relationship between accountability and transparency with agency cost is strong. In 
recent research, the relative degree of accountability and transparency of ISOE is proved 
to be higher than DSOE. This is because ISOE as a subset of SOE, has an additional 
layer of guidelines to ensure the adherence of transparency standards. On a macro level, 
the establishment of policies by different macro-institutions ensures the adherence of 
ISOE towards greater disclosure, easing the agency cost by different parties. Santiago 
Principles was implemented as a response towards the rise of SWF from the International 
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) (IWG, 2008). With detailed guidance 
in terms of appropriate investment practices, commitment to financial and non-political 
objectives, this principle seeks to create a benchmark for SWF to separate the 
management of SWF from the government and improve information flow (Kern, 2008). It 
is again acknowledged that oppositions tend to deny the effectiveness of such voluntary 
framework, stating the absence of solid penalty and formal monitoring committee. This is 
however defended by Bagnall & Truman (2013) stating that despite the inability to 
completely uphold the standards, there is proof of significant improvement that is 
sufficient to signal the progress for complete adherence in the future.  
 
2.5 Measuring Agency Cost 
In quantifiable terms, agency costs are costs that are used to prevent or rectify 
misalignment of interests. Some examples of agency cost include monitoring costs, 
auditing costs and additional incentive programmes. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) made a 
distinction between direct agency cost and loss in revenues in measuring agency costs. 
Direct agency cost was the relative comparison between a zero-agency cost firm and the 
target firm. The rationale would be to consider the additional cost due to agency cost (eg 
expropriation of private benefits). Loss in revenues are the costs from inefficient utilisation 
of assets, due to poor investment decisions. The financial ratio used was annual sales to 
total assets. Overall, this is an alternative to measure the loss from investing in negative 
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value adding investments or expropriation of private benefits. The assumption of agents 
(managers) being the primary reason for interest divergence, however, created a flaw for 
this method of analysis. This is because in this research, the principal (government) is 
responsible for exploiting the benefits of the company in various political objectives. Also, 
the comparison of DSOE and ISOE could create potential problems due to the lack of 
benchmark against a perfectly zero-agency cost company. 
 
With regards to accountability and transparency, the two most famous measurements 
implemented are the Santiago Principles and Truman’s SWF scoreboard. In Oct 19, 2007, 
Truman presented his scoreboard at Conference on China's Exchange Rate Policy to 
showcase the levels of transparency of SWF (Truman, 2007). According to the 4 metrics 
of structure, governance, transparency and accountability, and behaviour, it was 
concluded that most SWF scored an average of 10.27 out of 25 points (ibid). This method 
even highlighted the alarming position of the Temasek Holdings scoring 13.50, merely 
the average, despite the high performance with regards to return on investment (ibid). 
This presentation then encouraged the birth of Santiago Principles. Santiago Principles 
was a guideline for SWF to achieve better transparency and distance separation of 
political powers. It is however not yet known for its effectiveness and was constantly 
dismissed by the public and Truman himself, stating that the voluntary nature of the 
principles was a signal of failure and a 100% compliance does not necessarily propel any 
SWF to a complete 25 points in his scoreboard (Bagnall & Truman, 2013). Overall, the 
current research field of DSOE and ISOE provides a large number of standards for 
transparency but few truly designed a structured and focused quantifiable model such as 
Truman’s Scoreboard, hence the benchmark for transparency and accountability would 
be Truman’s Scoreboard. In order to ensure a standardised, unbiased testing for both 
DSOE and ISOE, it is also important to remove ISOE specific elements such as 




2.6 Conceptual Framework 
 
Fig. 1: Conceptual Framework 
 
The framework clearly outlines the direction of the overall thesis. It starts with the analysis 
of 2 state-ownership structure, filtered through the broad factors of political objectives and 
transparency to evaluate their relative agency cost.  
 
In this case, the dependent variable are the political motives, international involvement, 
capital preferences and transparency. They are all indicators of the agency cost. The 
independent variables are the 2 main state-ownership structures of DSOE and ISOE. The 
controlled variables shall be the industry of which the analysis is conducted. The setting 
of an industry provides for fairness because there is the riddance of operation, legal and 
financial complications within cross-industry analysis. Also, the abundance of ownership 





From the understanding of literature, the differences in ownership leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: ISOE has lower agency cost due to greater transparency pressures. 
H2: ISOE has lower agency cost due to the greater use of debt.  
H3: ISOE has higher agency cost due to the international diversification. 




This chapter discusses the research design, population of the study, data collection, 
operationalization of variables and statistical testing for significance. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
The reference design for this thesis would be the Truman scoreboard (2007). It is a 
scoreboard created to advocate for greater transparency of SWF. It was successful in 
inspiring the Santiago Principles. An updated version of scoreboard was published in 
2012 showcasing the high correlation with other SWF transparency scoreboard, such as 
Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, the Revenue Watch Institute’s 2013 Resource 
Governance Index, and Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index 
(Bagnall & Truman, 2013). The decision to choose Truman’s scoreboard was due to the 
combination of the 3 perspectives of the mentioned research designs in measuring 
transparency, hence the comprehensiveness and flexibility of research elements. 
 
Since we have other variables within the understanding of agency cost, the scoreboard 
will however be modified to add more variables such as finance, strategy, governance 
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and sustainability to tackle the research question in this thesis. The general element of 
transparency, which is the core of the original scoreboard will be retained.  
 
Also, another feature similar to the scoreboard is the short-term horizon compared in this 
research. By taking only the most recent years 2015-2016, the possibility of outliers within 
other years can be reduced, yielding more reliable data. The data for 2017 is not 
considered due to the differences in closing accounting period for some companies that 
are extended into the first quarter of 2018. Also, the assurance of audit is not applicable 
for 2017 as most companies have yet to publish them in the first quarter of 2018. 
 
The study on political objectives however is based on the research by Ang, Cole & Lin 
(2000) and Doukas, J.A. & Pantzalis, C. (2003). The main aims for the research is to 
examine the level of debt, the degree of internationalization and the level of agency cost 
based on accounting ratios.   
 
3.3 Population of the Study 
To provide a fair comparison, both types of chosen firms are evaluated based on their 
financial performance and stable political environment (Shih, 2009). Finnair, Garuda Air 
and Air China will represent DSOE, whereas Singapore Airline, Emirates Airline and 
Turkish Airways will represent ISOE. A summary of ownership is provided in Table 1. It is 
acknowledged that given the differences in market size, the results for these companies 









Table 2: Weightage by ROA 
 
3.4 Data Collection 
The study is dependent solely on secondary data provided on the individual companies’ 
website. The most common source of data is the annual report of individual companies. 
In some occasions, sustainability reports and financial statements are sourced separately 
on the website to correct the lack of information of the annual reports. This is acceptable 
because this research seeks to provide for the most accurate status of the companies. 
Therefore, the methodology used does not penalise for the format choice of publishing by 
individual companies, ie the choice to publish sustainability reports and annual report 
separately on the same webpage.  
Finnair Finnish Ministry of Finance/ 
Prime Minister's Office - Valtioneuvoston kanslia
55.8
Garuda PT Garuda Indonesia (Persero) Tbk 60.5
Air China Limited China State-Owned Assets Supervision & Admn 
Commission
100.0
Singapore Airline Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd. 56.0
Emirates Airline Investment Corporation of Dubai 100.0





List of Airlines Types Owned by
Finnair 0.52 0.50
Garuda 0.01 0.02
Air China Limited 0.47 0.48
Singapore Airline 0.20 0.14
Emirates Airline 0.38 0.57
Turkish Airways 0.41 0.29
List of Airlines Types
DSOE
ISOE




The period focused in this study is 2015-2016. The data extracted will be according to the 
reports published in that particular year. Any restated changes will not be taken into 
account with the assumption that all errors are uniform across the years. Although 
restated financial statements can provide for greater accuracy in financial statements, 
data extracted in the final year will not have the same accuracy advantage as the previous 
years as most data are not available yet. With the assumption of only systematic errors 
and zero random errors, the data for each year will be more comparable. 
 
The reason for a short-term horizon of 2015-2016 is to eliminate possible outliers in the 
data due to ad hoc projects by individual companies. This can be hinted by financial 
indicators, such as, a large outflow of assets, higher cost and greater debt etc. Also, with 
the use of recent years data, this research will be more relevant to address any agency 
cost of either ownership structures, if any significant differences are proven amongst them. 
 
The use of accounting ratios is key to analysing the raw data extracted. The main reason 
for the use of accounting ratios is the differences in currency reported. For an unbiased 
comparison between the airlines, accounting ratios eliminate the complications of 
currency conversions due to the volatility of currency market.  
 
Another precautionary measure to standardise the data for each airline is to take the 
financial data from the combination of parent and subsidiaries. As opposed to the carved-
out method of reporting, the actual earnings and cost of the airlines will not be reflected. 
Also, the evaluation for selective reporting will differ between companies, thus not ideal 
for the use of this research.  
 
The main assumption of data collection via secondary data is that transparency is 100%, 
despite having to test the transparency in these companies as one of the research 
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purpose. However, this research proceeds with this method because the test for 
transparency itself does not require the assumption of transparency, but merely the 
availability of specific data in their annual reporting to the public.  
 
3.6 Operationalization of the Study Variables 
3.6.1 Measurement of Transparency and Accountability 
In this segment, the measurement for transparency is further broken down into general 
features, financial, governance, strategy and sustainability.  
 
Under the category of general features, the scores will provide an overview of the 
minimum requirements of a fully comprehensive and transparent report. “Annual report” 
shows the number of the annual report provided within the years of 2015-2016. A 
consistent reporting system by individual companies will yield a maximum score of 2.  
 
Auditing is another measure for general transparency. It is acknowledged that both 
internal and external audit plays a role in ensuring transparency in both internal 
management level and external entities. Internal audit helps curb agency cost by 
overseeing the internal governance system (Cai, Hillier,Tian & Wu, 2015); whereas 
external audit represents the interest of the general public or third party institutions in 
verifying the credibility of the reports presented (Chow, 1982). Publication of audit reports, 
in this study, however, only takes into account the external audit reports. This is due to 
the nature of non-publication of internal reports being less likely disseminated within and 
outside the organisation. According to Institute of Internal Auditors (2012), only 86% of 
companies within the surveyed countries are publishing their internal audit report on the 
internet. To be more objective, on the intranet, the percentage of companies only differ 
by 11%, at 75%. Overall, there is an apparent lack of information across companies that 




The frequency of auditing, together with the publishing of audit reports informs the public 
of the level of credibility of a certain company. A robust audit function, independence of 
auditing, coupled with both internal and external auditing is able to ensure an acceptable 
level of transparency (OECD, 2016; AARF, 2001). Following that, the questions 
associated with our scoreboard are the frequency of regular external audit. This can be 
found in the explanation of audit guidelines of each company. 1 point is awarded for every 
audit year. Next, the publication of the audit report is important to signal accessibility. 1 
point is awarded for every published audit report. Lastly, the independence of external 
auditors must be established. 1 point is awarded to companies if external auditors are 
employed for the duration of 2 years of publications. 
 
The finance segment is used to further distinguish the transparency of each companies 
within the different ownership categories. “Source of fund” is an indicator towards the 
reporting of balance sheet, showing the 2 sources of capital - debt and equity. A maximum 
score of 2 is awarded for financial statements published in the years of 2015-2016. 
“Subsidiaries” is examined through the reporting of subsidiaries financial statements and 
ownership percentage. 1 point is awarded per year if the company provide financial 
information of its subsidiaries within their financial statements. “Leasing agreement” is 
unique in the airline industry due to the nature of aircraft leasing. This is therefore an 
important information to be reported. Information published in the annual report with 
regards to aircraft leasing will be given 1 point per year. “Management principles” refer to 
the listing of guidelines adhered to by each airline. This is important because it extends 
into the auditing, accounting, sustainability and legal guidelines of each companies. The 
reference towards specific guidelines within the different segments of annual report will 
grant each airline 1 point per annual report. Lastly, “shareholder structure” explains the 
declaration of top shareholders within the airlines. 1 point is awarded to any exhibit or 
description of top shareholders who total up a 50% of the company.  
 
Governance is made up of “general meeting agenda”, “risk assessment” and 
“remuneration”. “General meeting agenda” refers to the reporting of general meeting 
agenda in the annual report. 1 point is awarded per report. “Risk assessment” is used to 
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understand the airline’s ability to forecast and disclose potential risks. 1 point is awarded 
to the listing of risks within each annual report. “Remuneration” of executives is important 
to promote transparency and therefore 1 point is awarded to the publication of types and 
level of executive remuneration per year. 
 
Strategy consists of highlights of a company and stakeholder engagement. “Highlights” 
published informs the public on the challenges and growth of a company in general, given 
the strategy proposed in previous years. 1 point per report is awarded for any business 
overview within the reports. “Stakeholder engagement” communicates to different 
stakeholders the strategy targeting them. This way, the annual report is considered 
transparent to different levels of stakeholders and public. 1 point is awarded for the 
reporting of strategy in each report. 
 
Sustainability reporting is now becoming a standard in various industries, therefore is 
essential as a component of transparency. 1 point is awarded for a comprehensive 
segment addressing sustainability issues. A mere mention of environmental 
consideration without substantiating statistical figures is not acceptable. It is however 
acceptable to consider a separate sustainability report than the annual report alone. 
 
The extraction of data is followed by the calculation of average of scores for each airline. 
Then, the results of individual airline are weighted according to their ROA. The average 
of each ownership structure is also calculated to provide for a simplistic comparison. 
Overall, a paired sample t-test will be used to provide for a better statistical comparison. 
 
3.6.2 Measurement of Political Involvement  
3.6.2.1 Use of Debt 
Debt to equity ratio measures the level of debt financing in comparison to equity financing. 
In the literature review, the increase in debt is seen as a proxy for lower agency cost. 
Following the reasoning, the level of debt is essential to provide for a clearer 
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understanding of agency cost within each ownership structure. The formula for debt-to-
equity ratio is as followed: 
DE Ratio = Total Debt / Shareholders Equity 
 
3.6.2.2 International Diversification  
International operation between the 2 ownership structures is measured via the formula:  
Foreign Sales Ratio (FSALE) =Foreign sales/Total Sales 
A greater sales ratio explains the degree of internationalisation of the airline. All of the 
data extracted are according to the geographical segmentation of each airline’s revenue, 
with the exception of Singapore Airline. This is because there are no domestic sales 
available for Singapore airline. Also, another key note is that since there is a lack of 
passenger traffic revenue breakdown, the estimation of sales is based on revenue which 
can originate from airline passengers and cargo freight.    
 
3.6.3 Measurement of Agency Cost 
In order to capture agency cost, the following accounting formulas are used: 
(1) …………………….AC1=Market-Book ratio of equity, where  
Market Value = Market Price * Shares Outstanding 
Book value Total asset – Intangible asset – Total liability 
According to Xiao and Zhao (2014), market to book ratio is a good approximation of 
agency cost. As explained, with the presence of agency cost, the stock market will react 
unfavorably, causing market value to decrease. AC1 is therefore useful in showing the 
reflected value of the market values in comparison to the accounting ratio of book value. 
In the case where market values are lower than book value, then the airline is assumed 




The share prices extracted is following the adjusted close for the 31st of December each 
year. In the collection of data, however, Emirates airline presented a problem due to the 
lack of share prices in the annual report, financial statements and general trading 
platforms. This hence led to the considerations of alternatives for agency costs. 
 
(2) ………………………………AC2= Net Income/Total Asset 
Return on Assets is useful in understanding the efficient use of asset in generating income. 
As agency cost increase, management of the firm is assumed to be inefficient in the usage 
of assets, for example, lax monitoring of operating cost, excessive perquisites 
consumptions or the neglect in decision making for the use of assets, thus decreasing 
ROA. The only flaw within this indicator is the use of ROA as both the results, as well as 
the weighting factor.  
 
(3) ………………………………AC3=EBITDA/Total Asset, where  
EBITDA =Operating Income before depreciation – interest – tax - depreciation 
In order to further examine agency cost, EBITDA is a useful indicator of the earnings 
without the influence of depreciation, tax or debt interest payments. This way, most 
companies are comparable regardless of the differences in taxation and depreciation 
regulations between countries. Also, the level of debt with the potential influence on 
interest payment and tax shield is also eliminated. Overall, EBITDA ensures a fairer 
comparison of across different companies despite having the results weighted against the 
level of assets and equities. 
 
3.7 T-Test: Paired Two Samples for Means 
This research will conduct a paired t-test using two samples – DSOE and ISOE. This 
statistical design requires for a dependent nature for the samples and a pairwise matching 
of individual samples that possess similar but not identical traits. In this case, the pairing 
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will be according to the rankings of results within each ownership structures. For example, 
the airline from each structure with the greatest results will be paired, the lowest result 
forms another pair and the remaining airline forms the last pair.   
 
The two ways of interpretation of this test are the p-value and t-stat value. For the p-value, 
the comparison is against the predetermined level of alpha = 0.05. At this level, if the 
results produce a p-value smaller than 0.05, the test is significant. Conversely, a p-value 
greater than 0.05 will be rejected and conclude for an insignificant test result. The second 
method is the comparison between t-critical and t-stat. In a one tail test, the null 
hypothesis for a t-test is rejected when the t-obtained is equal to, or more extreme than, 
the t-critical value. Only the absolute values of the t-critical and t-stat values are used, 
which means the neglect of signs of those values. A greater concern for this method is 
also the consistency in tail direction with the context of the test.  
 
Beyond the numerical understanding of the results, the accepting of the null hypothesis 
at an alpha level of 0.05 also means that there is a confidence level of 95% that a repeated 
test conducted will yield similar results as the one produced in this study.    
 
3.8 Limitations  
The use of secondary data from companies’ annual report presumed that all companies 
are reporting the most accurate figures, hence implying a 100% compliance with 
transparency framework. The flaw in this design however is reflected in the differing 
transparency index across different frameworks, including our modified Truman 
scoreboard. 
 
The second limitation is the targeted population for the design of Truman’s scoreboard – 
sovereign wealth fund. The initial aim for the scoreboard is to propose for a benchmark 
for comparison for sovereign wealth funds. With the successful promotion of Santiago 
Principles, the applicability for ISOE is apparent. However, to justify the similar level of 
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relevance for DSOE would be to compare the variables tested against other research. 
With cross-references to Bushman, Piotroski & Smith (2004), the use of similar variables 
in that research, such as governance, audit, timing and disclosure mirrors the variables 
tested for in this paper. 
 
The understanding of agency cost in this case is different because unlike conventional 
agency cost cases, it is initiated by the principals (politicians) rather than the agents 
(managers). This hence weakens the position of AC1, AC2 and AC3 as an indicator of 
agency cost. The political agenda by principals therefore might not be reflected in the 
accounting ratios used to provide an estimation for agency cost. 
 
The limitations on the statistical analysis are also essential. With a sample size of smaller 
than 30 and the absence of test for normality in the null hypothesis, the assumptions for 





Under the general category of transparency (table 3), it is seen that all airlines, regardless 
of their ownership types, are compliant with the minimum transparency guideline, which 
are the publication of annual reports, annual auditing and reporting of audit results, as 
well as the employment of external auditors for the duration of 2015-2016. 
 
Frequency/year Published
Finnair 2 1 2 PWC 1
Garuda 2 1 2 Deloitte 1
Air China Limited 2 1 2 KPMG 1
Singapore Airline 2 1 2 EY/KPMG 1
Emirates Airline 2 1 2 PWC 1
Turkish Airways 2 1 2 KPMG 1









Table 3: Transparency - General 
Under the financial category (table 4), a general observation concludes that DSOE is 
more transparent due to the underperforming Emirates Airline in ISOE. It is to be noted 
that the low scores due to vague explanations are both from 2015 which is the outlier 
when compared to the other years. 
 
 
Table 4: Transparency – Finance 
 
Under the governance feature (table 5), ISOE also underperformed with Emirates scoring 
0 in “General meeting” and “Remuneration”. In a detailed examination of Emirate’s annual 
reports, it is understood that Emirates have yet to consider them a significant reporting 
segment as compared to other categories. Likewise, Turkish Airways merely provided a 
brief overview of the remuneration scheme without numerical evidence hence the lower 
score than others. 
 
 
Finnair 2 2 2 2 2
Garuda 2 2 1 2 2
Air China Limited 2 2 2 2 2
Singapore Airline 2 2 2 2 2
Emirates Airline 2 2 1 0.5 2
Turkish Airways 2 2 2 2 2











Finnair 2 2 2
Garuda 2 2 2
Air China Limited 2 2 2
Singapore Airline 2 2 2
Emirates Airline 0 2 0
Turkish Airways 2 2 1











Table 5: Transparency - Governance 
 
In the strategy category (table 6), DSOE performed marginally better than ISOE. All 
airlines performed well for disclosing their yearly news and highlights. In the sustainability 
category (table 6), ISOE scores greater than DSOE. The interesting feature of this 
category is that despite the lack of publication of sustainable reports, it is noted that 
airlines with sustainability reports produced highly detailed reports with credible 
accreditations and association with major sustainability movements. Some examples 
include the Sustainable Development Goals and all rounded stakeholder engagement. 
 
 
Table 6: Transparency – Strategy and Sustainability 
 
There was no significant difference in the transparency results weighted with ROA within 
the years of 2015-2016, t(2) = 0.28 (< 2.92), p=0.4 (> 0.05) (table 7). For samples tested, 
the level of transparency between ISOE and DSOE are similar. 
 
Sustainability
Finnair 2 2 1
Garuda 2 1 2
Air China Limited 2 0 1
Singapore Airline 2 0 2
Emirates Airline 2 0 1
Turkish Airways 2 2 2
Report 










Table 7: T-test with ROA 
 
4.2 Debt 
A general observation will conclude the level of debts in the both weighted cases for ISOE 
is on average greater than DSOE. For weighted ROA, ISOE has an average 0.76 
compared to 0.66 for DSOE (table 8). 
 
 
Table 8: Debt weighted with ROA 
 
There was a significant difference in the level of debts weighted with ROA within the years 
of 2015-2016, t(2) = 4.49 (> 2.92), p=0.02 (< 0.05). For samples tested, ISOE has higher 










t Critical one-tail 2.92
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.80
t Critical two-tail 4.30
0.40
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means (weighted with ROA)
List of Airlines Types AVERAGE (ROA)
Finnair 0.975















From a general comparison of mean of FSALE for DSOE and ISOE indicates a greater 
level of internationalisation of ISOE airlines than DSOE. In the ROA weighted case, ISOE 
has a mean of 5.63 compared to DSOE with a mean of 2.69. 
 
 











t Critical one-tail 2.92
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.05
t Critical two-tail 4.30
0.02
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means (weighted with ROA)
List of Airlines Types FSALE
Finnair 0.962
Garuda 2.636








There was a significant difference in the level of international diversification weighted with 
ROA within the years of 2015-2016, t(2) = 13.59 (> 2.92), p=0.0027 (< 0.05). For samples 




Table 11: T-test with ROA 
 
4.4 Agency Cost 
All three metrics are estimators of the level of agency cost, however, the results for each 
metrics varied greatly. AC1 is invalidated as the lack of market price for Emirates Airline 
share prices creates a problem to generate market value for comparison against its book 
value. Since this is a paired test, it is crucial to remove AC1 for a bias-free result. 
 
A general observation for AC2 weighted by ROA indicates a lower level of agency cost 
for DSOE than ISOE because ISOE is able to generate greater net income from its 
existing assets. In AC3, however, there is no apparent differences between the mean of 











t Critical one-tail 2.9200
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0054
t Critical two-tail 4.3027
0.0027




Table 12: Agency cost with ROA 
 
There was a significant difference in the level of approximated agency cost AC2 weighted 
with ROA within the years of 2015-2016, t(2) = 3.658 (> 2.92), p=0.034 (< 0.05). 
 
 
Table 13: T-test with AC2 with ROA 
 
There was no significant difference in the level of approximated agency cost AC3 
weighted with ROA within the years of 2015-2016, t(2) = 0.406 (< 2.92), p=0.362 (> 0.05). 
 
List of Airlines Types
Finnair 0.398 0.020 0.055
Garuda 0.000 0.000 0.001
Air China Limited 0.090 0.016 0.064
Singapore Airline 0.197 0.005 0.020
Emirates Airline N/A 0.019 0.044
Turkish Airways -0.198 0.022 0.042
DSOE 0.16 0.040.01
ISOE 0.00 0.040.02
AD1 = Market-to-book 
ratio of equity















t Critical one-tail 2.920
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.067
t Critical two-tail 4.303





Table 14: T-test with AC3 with ROA 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
This section will address the research questions established earlier. Following a logical 
order of discussion, it is crucial to first highlight the differentiating factors between the 
different ownership structures. The methodology used to emphasise the differences in 
ownership structure between DSOE and ISOE is through the different levels of 
transparency, debt and internationalisation. The second part of the discussion will be the 
impact of agency cost according to the different ownership structures. This method is 
reliant on the estimation of agency cost through financial performances of the airline. All 
conclusion of hypothesis is based on the statistical significance of paired sample mean t-
test at alpha level=0.05.  
 
5.1 Differentiation of ownership structures 
Under the transparency analysis, all analysis showed no significant differences between 
DSOE and ISOE. Although there exist strong arguments for ISOE being more transparent 
than DSOE stating the strong advocation of ISOE for transparent measures (Kern, 2008), 
the results using similar scoreboard measurement do not reflect the convention. This 










t Critical one-tail 2.920
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.724
t Critical two-tail 4.303




providing a fair comparison between the two structures as well as the transparency being 
dependent against country level of transparency, rather than ownership structure. 
 
The incompatibility stems from the difference in target sample and the variables used. In 
Truman’s original scoreboard, the target sample was sovereign wealth funds, as 
compared to the sample of individual companies within the pool of sovereign wealth funds 
or governmental agencies. This means that there exist a new set of assumption of trickle-
down effect from the macro ownership structure to the individual firms. However, there is 
a possibility that individual airline companies are not representative of the macro 
ownership structure, hence do not possess similar features as when companies are 
grouped collectively in their sovereign wealth pool. Another explanation of intrinsic 
differences of samples are that airline companies could possess a unique set of 
transparency guidelines that are not explicitly tested in this research. For example, the 
use of Airline Disclosure Guide (ADG) established by the IATA Industry Accounting 
Working Group (IAWG) that can better estimate the reporting standards and transparency 
of the airlines compared. Further research into the specific dependency of airline and 
sovereign wealth fund is therefore important to reinforce the findings of this paper.  
 
Also, the differences in variables is another possible factor that adds to the incompatibility 
of methodology. The original research had an independent segment on investment 
strategies of the funds, budgeting and relationship with international governmental 
organisations. However, due to the differences in sample targeted, those variables are 
not applicable. The addition of other variables is also utilised in the replacement of the 
original research. This posed the benefits of relevance however at the expense of 
reduced reliability in the research design.  
 
Also, the lack of significant differences could be attributed to the classification by country 
being a stronger driver than ownership differences. According to Bushman, Piotroski and 
Smith (2004), a country’s legal and judicial regime is a strong factor of the corporate 
transparency. Although the authors only test for financial and governance disclosure, the 
results showed a more significant divide between the different companies differentiated 
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with legal origins, patent rights, judicial system and political economy.  It is therefore 
recommended to attempt the same test with different methodologies that are better suited 
for both ownership structures, airline specific variables and independent of country effects. 
 
Under the debt analysis, it is concluded that levels of debt provided a significant contrast 
between the ownership. Although this is parallel to the discussion of contrast between the 
level of debt between structures, the findings however stand to contradict the conjecture 
that DSOE has higher debt levels than ISOE. The method employed to measure debt 
level within airlines is however rather myopic. The reason is that debt-to-equity ratio only 
provide for a comparison between the proportion of debt and equity financing. There is 
however a better scaled comparison which is the debt-to-enterprise value which can 
provide a more comprehensive understanding towards the level of debt unaffected by 
enterprise size. The drawback however is the inability to estimate the actual enterprise 
value of the firm, hence in this research, the use of debt-to-equity ratio remained practical 
and central to the analysis. 
 
In order to improve, it is also recommended to include other elements of debts such as 
leasing and acquisitions, in order to provide a better application towards the airline 
industry. According to Gritta, Lippman & Chow (1994), the common phenomena of 
airlines embarking on strategic leasing will affect the debt-to-equity ratio. The authors 
further recommended for leasing to be considered as an important variable in the affecting 
of debt structure of individual airlines. Leasing information can be found in most annual 
reports and are generally reported according to the IAS 17 reporting guidelines (IFRS, 
2017). 
 
Under the internationalisation analysis, the levels of internationalisation between DSOE 
and ISOE is very significant and proved that ISOE is more international than DSOE. 
Although the results are proved to be successful, improvement via the addition of other 
internationalisation variables such as percentage of international assets can better 
critique the hypothesis for more reliable findings. In addition, testing the drivers of 
internationalisation – framework factors, conditioning factors and general environment 
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factors against the airline directly can be a better approximation of internationalisation 
(Belniak, 2015).  
 
5.2 Impact on Agency Cost 
Overall, the first section concludes that there is a significant distinction between DSOE 
and ISOE under the variables of debt and internationalisation. The second section will 
continue to examine the impact of the different structures on agency cost.  
 
Across all the approximations for agency cost, AC1 is invalidated due to the lack of market 
share price for Emirates Airline. AC2 indicated for a strong presence of agency cost 
whereas AC3 shows a conflicting insignificance in result. The difference in these two 
methods is primarily the exclusion of tax, depreciation and interest. Although the 
exclusion of tax, depreciation and interest could provide a more accurate representation 
of gross profit, however this is unfair to when management inefficiency/agency cost can 
be reflected in the management of taxation, depreciation expense and interest rates as 
well. Therefore, the decision to measure agency cost solely on AC2 is based on the 
former reasoning. 
 
In AC2, ISOE is performing 50% more efficiently and therefore has a lower agency cost 
than DSOE. The following are the results for the hypothesis according to the results in 
AC2: 
 
H1 (rejected): ISOE has lower agency cost due to greater transparency pressures. 
This hypothesis is rejected primarily because of the indistinguishable level of 
transparency between the two ownership structures (table 7). 
 
H2 (accepted): ISOE has lower agency cost due to the greater use of debt. This 
hypothesis is accepted because ISOE has 50% lower agency cost and greater use 




H3 (rejected): ISOE has higher agency cost due to the international diversification. 
This hypothesis is rejected primarily because results concluded for ISOE having a 
lower agency cost. 
 
H4 (accepted): ISOE has lower agency cost due to the international diversification. 
This hypothesis is accepted because ISOE has 50% lower agency cost and higher 
level of internationalisation with a confidence level of 99.73%. 
 
 
The flaw in these conclusions is the lack of correlation test for causality between the 
structural differences and agency cost. The methods employed only measure the level of 
contrast between the two ownership structures, however, there could exist exogenous 
variables that affect the agency cost level. Therefore, the research objective to investigate 
the relative importance of each characteristic in impacting agency cost is weakly 
established. A proposal for the use of more airlines and regression test against different 
independent ownership structure can be conducted for the understanding of the 
correlations. 
 
5.3 Application to Airline Industries 
The airline industry today operates in a spectrum of ownership structures, ranging from 
privatisation, full state-owned, partial privatisation, ISOE, etc. The difference in ownership 
structures is employed to seek strategic benefits in various functions. In this research, the 
strategic benefit targeted is the inefficient management due to agency cost.  
 
In conclusion, the findings remained positive on ISOE having lower agency cost than 
DSOE. This means that ideally, airlines should employ the ISOE ownership structure 
within the branches of nationalisation. According to the research yield, the airlines will 
achieve 50% higher net income with the reduction of agency cost.  
 
To remain practical, however, there must be an awareness of the potential inability to 
achieve similar results due to the impact from other firm-specific variables as discussed 
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earlier. Leasing, aircraft transparency guidelines, and country specific influence can 
create unknown challenges in the implementation of this ownership structure. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
6.1 Main Findings 
This research is segmented into 2 parts – the differentiation of ownerships and the test 
for agency cost. In the first part, research findings showed no difference for transparency 
between the ISOE airlines (presumed to exemplify higher transparency) and DSOE. This 
is explained by the incompatibility of Truman’s scoreboard and the dependence of 
variable against country’s level of transparency. This research therefore points to the 
need to neutralise country and parent-company dependent elements, such as investment 
strategies of the funds, budgeting and relationship with international governmental 
organisations. 
 
The research however showed significant differences between ISOE and DSOE in the 
remaining 2 variables, debt and internationalisation. For debt level, ISOE has a higher 
level of debt than DSOE with a confidence level of 98%. For internationalisation level, 
ISOE has a higher level of internationalisation with a confidence level of 99.73%. The 
conclusions in the first part addresses the research question of identifying the general 
characteristics of direct state-owned or indirect state-owned companies.  
 
In the second part, the focus of the paper shifts towards the presence and extent of 
agency cost within these ownership structures. Although both AC2 and AC3 have similar 
level of statistical reliability, results from AC2 is preferred to estimate agency cost due to 
the inclusion of tax, depreciation and interest for a more holistic analysis. The use of AC1 
is nullified due to the lack of information for market prices of Emirates airline.  
 
The results according to AC2 are that ISOE performed 50% more efficiently than DSOE 
with a confidence level of 96.6%. This directly addresses the research question and 
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objectives in understanding the extent of difference in agency cost and statistically 
verifying the hypothesis of ISOE having a lower agency cost than DSOE in general. 
 
Although the research attempt to emphasize the relationship between agency cost and 
state ownership structure in the airline industry for practical managerial purposes, it is 
found that further research with more data (greater pool of airlines from the respective 
structures and SWF-independent variables) is needed to establish a correlation and 
regression test to support this research. 
 
6.2 Implications for International Business 
International business is the main core of this research. The features of international 
business permeate every section of the paper, beginning from research questions to the 
analysis of findings. The formulation of research question started with a general overview 
of the international airline industry. It was the need for understanding the underlying 
strategic benefits of the state-ownership structures that prompted for this study. Across 
the literature review, there are numerous mentioning of international concerns, such as, 
the international politicizing of SOE and elimination of cross-country currency differences. 
The methodology (Truman’s scoreboard) implemented also took into consideration the 
international applicability of the samples as it was being tested on 28 countries. Upon 
concluding the findings and future research, the use of standardised guideline for airline 
industry in diluting country specific features is suggested. 
 
In the analysis of airline industry, the globalised nature of the airline operations provokes 
the need to understand the different measure they undertake to make operations more 
efficient. In this thesis, the airline industry is examined from an ownership perspective 
and measured with their agency cost. The findings and future research also indicates a 
strong need to consider a macro world-wide environment. The multi-variate factors that 





6.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
In order to address the flaws and improve the reliability of the research, there are several 
macro and variable-specific challenges that could be addressed in the future. The main 
macro challenge is the relatively weak response of this research towards the causality 
relationship between ownership structure and agency cost. The current research only 
draws upon the differences between the agency cost of the ownership structures, instead 
of demonstrating the correlation between specific elements contributed by the differences 
in ownerships. Therefore, further research should first consider this aspect of 
improvement.  
 
The other suggestion for future research in relation to the methodology is the need for 
better guidelines for inclusion and exclusion of variables. As discussed earlier, there is a 
need to include testing for trickle down effect from a macro analysis, country-specific 
features that could skew the results of the tests and international guidelines on industry-
specific variables such as Airline Disclosure Guide (ADG) established by the IATA 
Industry Accounting Working Group (IAWG) in the case of airline industry. The aim of 
future research is therefore to increase the relevance of test. 
 
With regards to the level of debt, the formula used in this research (debt-to-equity) can 
be substituted with debt-to-enterprise value. This way, without the need to scale against 
ROA, this formula is able to provide a more comprehensive understanding towards the 
level of debt unaffected by enterprise size. The weakness of ROA-scaling assumes that 
the total asset of the company is a good estimation of enterprise value however it is not 
necessarily the case for most companies. Leasing is also under the components of debt 
that is essential to airline industries. From the discussion earlier, it is understood that 
leasing is an important factor in affecting debt structure hence should be weighed stronger 
in future research. Since most companies are required to provide leasing information 
under the IFRS accounting report system, the accessibility warrants itself greater 




In the internationalisation aspect, it is recommended to include greater number of 
internationalisation variables to challenge the initial result in this research. Some 
examples include percentage of international assets, and testing for effects from 
framework factors, conditioning factors and general environment factors.  
  
Lastly, general recommendations for future research are the extension of research scope 
into other industry, greater number of airlines and establish the independent assumptions 
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